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They Dropped the Ball: The Failure of
the Nevada Supreme Court to Consider
the Impact of the ICCPR's Ban on
Capital Punishment for Juvenile
Offenders in Domingues v. State
I. Introduction
Most of us are familiar with Amnesty International and the
organization's ongoing campaigns against worldwide abuses of
human rights. We may be familiar with current campaigns in
Kosovo, for example, or in South Asia and Rwanda. War crimes,
child prostitution and female genital mutilation are obvious and
horrific human rights violations. But Amnesty International does
not only target these kinds of violations and the third world
environment in which they are occurring. Americans may be
surprised to learn that, in October 1998, Amnesty International
began a year-long investigation of human rights violations in the
United States.' Our continued use of the death penalty,
generally,' and on juvenile offenders, specifically,' were among
those issues at the focus of the investigation.
This Comment will address the continued use of the death
penalty against juvenile offenders in the United States. The focus
will be on a recent Nevada Supreme Court case, Domingues v.
State. This case presented a direct challenge to the legality of
death penalty sentences for juvenile offenders under an
international treaty called the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights ("Covenant"). Before addressing the case,
however, a brief discussion of some important background
material will help put the topic in to a workable context. A brief
1. William Raspberry, Human Rights Violations in the U.S.?, TULSA TRIB.
& TULSA WORLD, Oct. 15, 1998, at 17.
2. Amnesty International, USA Rights For All B Overview (visited Jan. 5,
1999) <http://www.rightsforall-usa.org/intro/index.html>.
3. Raspberry, supra note 1.
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history of the use of the death penalty in this country will be
followed by a discussion concerningthe current United Nations
position on the issue. The Comment will then address the
Covenant itself and examine the circumstances surrounding its
ratification in the United. States. Constitutional concerns are
pervasive throughout this issue and so an examination of relevant
Supreme Court decisions will be included. The Comment will
conclude by analyzing the state of Nevada's Supreme Court
decision in the case of Domingues v. State.
II. Background
A. Use of the Death Penalty in the United States
The death penalty has always been used as punishment in the
United States.4 Its use saw a brief hiatus in 1972 when the
Supreme Court ruled, in Furman v. Georgia, that because its use
was "capricious and arbitrary" the death penalty violated the
Eighth Amendment and was unconstitutional. In 1976, however,
the Court held in Roberts v. Louisiana that the death penalty wasS • 6
not per se unconstitutional. As long as its use is not "capricious
and arbitrary," the court held, the death penalty does not violate
the Constitution.7 The use of capital punishment in this country
has been growing steadily since the Roberts decision was handed
8down. One scholar attributes the rise in the use of the death
penalty in the United States to "a widespread fear of crime,
coupled with the belief that only traditional disciplinary solutions
-such as the death penalty-can cure society's ills." 9
More than 20,000 murders occur in the U.S. every year. 0 As
of 1992 only about half of these cases result in convictions.11 Of
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The text of the amendment begins by stating
that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime...." This language clearly contemplates capital punishment as an
acceptable form of punishment. Id.
5. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
6. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
7. See id.
8. Tom Phillips, Capital Punishment Revival (End of the Rope, part 3),
CONTEMP. REV., Vol. 272, No. 1587, Apr. 1998 at 181.
9. Id.
10. Andrew Stevens, U.S.A.: Andrew Steven's America -Primeval Fear Stirs
the Lynch Mob -Why Executions are Increasing, OBSERVER REUTER TEXTLINE,
Apr. 19, 1992 at 16.
11. Id.
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those cases that result in a conviction, only about 300 individuals
are sentenced to death." This uneven application of the death
penalty sparked a United Nations report that the capitol
punishment system in America. 3 Senegalese investigator Bacre
Waly Ndiaye charged in his report that the United States still
applies the death penalty in an Aunfair, arbitrary and
discriminatory way.' 4 Race, ethnic origin and economic status,
according to Ndiaye, were the key determinants regarding
imposition of the death penalty. 5
B. The United Nations Human Rights Commission and the Death
Penalty
The United Nations has continued to advocate abolishment
of the death penalty in all countries." In April 1998 the United
Nations Human Rights Commission passed a resolution against
the death penalty, calling for states to "establish a moratorium on
executions, with a view to completely abolishing the death
penalty."'7 Twenty-six of the commission's fifty-three member
countries approved the resolution while thirteen members,
including the United States, voted against it. 8 In a statement
explaining the U.S. stance on the resolution, George Moose,
ambassador at the U.S. permanent mission in Geneva, said that
"[w]e believe that in a democratic society, the criminal justice
system, including the punishments prescribed for the most serious
crimes, should reflect the will of the people freely expressed."' 9
His reference, of course, was to the will of the people of the
United States, as separate and apart from the will of the world as a
whole. This distinction is key to those opposed to full U.S.
compliance with the Covenant.
Although resolutions passed by the U.N. Human Rights
Commission do not have the force of law they represent political
and ethical condemnation.20  This condemnation stems from
12. Id.
13 13Elif Kaban, US Rejects UN Executions Charge as "Severely Flawed,"
AAP NEWSFEED, Apr. 15, 1998, available in LEXIS, Nationwide General News.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. UN Death Penalty Resolution Puts US Into Camp of Authoritarian
Regimes, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Apr. 3, 1998.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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growing world disapproval of any use of the death penalty-
Amnesty International reports that one hundred and three
countries have abolished the death penalty entirely in law or in
practice, while ninety-one still sanction its use.2' The United
States is one of only two western countries with industrialized
economies that maintains capital punishment laws on the books;
Japan is the other country. 2 Further, only six countries have
executed juvenile offenders under the age of eighteen since 1990:
Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and the United
States.23
III. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(Covenant) represents what was an early effort by the
international community to give force to the principles of human
rights embodied in the United Nations Charter 24 and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.25 S• • 26
The process of U.S. ratification of the Covenant began with
Eleanor Roosevelt 7 She chaired the early sessions of the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights during its initial
21. Id.
22. UN Death Penalty Resolution Puts US Into Camp of Authoritarian
Regimes, supra note 16.
23. Id.
24. United States: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 31 I.L.M. 645, 649 (1992).
See THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 1945-1995, Volume VII, The
United Nations Blue Book Series at 143. Chapter 1, Article 1(3) of the United
Nations Charter states that one of the purposes of the United Nations is "[t]o
achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." Id.
25. United States: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 24. See THE
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS 372 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981). Article Three of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights states that "[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty,
and security of person." Id.
26. To "ratify" means to "authorize or otherwise approve, retroactively, an
agreement or conduct either expressly or by implication." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 872 (Abridged 6th ed. 1991).
27. William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?, 21 BROOK. J.
INT'L. L. 277, 278 (1995).
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preparation of the treaty." The Covenant was adopted unani-
mously by the United Nations General Assembly on December
16, 1966, and entered into force on March 23, 1976.29 The United
States, however, did not ratify the treaty until 1992.30
Despite Mrs. Roosevelt's early work in support of this issue,
U.S. ratification of the international agreement did not come
quickly as a series of administrations would not ratify the
Covenant.3 Although President Carter made an attempt to ratify
the instrument and submitted it to the Senate for its advice and
consent, the matter was dropped again under the Reagan
Administration. No further action was taken concerning the
covenant until George Bush was elected President.33
A. Federalism Concerns about U.S. Ratification of the Covenant
One likely explanation for this delay in ratification is due to
the issue of federalism.34 Criminal procedure and the use of the
death penalty fall to the individual states to administer, limited
only by Constitutional guidelines.35 The Supreme Court has held
that the states' use of the death penalty for juvenile offenders does
not violate the Constitution." Accordingly, the federal govern-
ment has been unwilling to force the states into compliance with
the Covenant's international standards regarding use of the death
penalty as a punishment for juvenile offenders.37
1. The U.S. Supreme Court and the Death Penalty for
Juvenile Offenders (Stanford v. Kentucky). -The Supreme Court
has officially upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty for
juvenile offenders aged sixteen and seventeen.3" Congress has
28. Id.
29. United States: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 24 at 645.
30. Id.
31. Schabas, supra note 27, at 278.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See generally Peter J. Spiro, The States and International Human Rights,
66 FORDHAM L. REV. 567 (1997).
35. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. The text of the amendment states that A[t]he
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." Id.
36. United States: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 24, at 650.
37. Spiro, supra note 34.
38. United States: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 24, at 650. See
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taken the position that to allow the Covenant to restrict the state's
use of such penalty allows the Covenant to contravene a
Constitutional right. The Supreme Court did not rule, however,
that a state's right to impose the death penalty on juvenile
offenders stands at the level of being a Constitutional right.40 The
Supreme Court's decision in Stanford v. Kentucky states simply
that imposing capital punishment for murders committed at 16
and 17 years of age does not violate the Constitution.' A quick
look at the reasoning behind both the majority and dissenting
opinions in this case can be helpful in understanding U.S.
reluctance to comply with the Covenant.
a. The majority opinion. -Justice Scalia wrote for the
majority in the Stanford opinion and began his analysis by stating
that a particular punishment violates the Eighth Amendment only
if it constitutes "one of 'those modes or acts of punishment...
considered cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights
was adopted'. 42  The death penalty for juvenile offenders, he
noted, was acceptable at the time that the Bill of Rights was
adopted.43
An interesting consideration made in the opinion dealt with
whether the use of capital punishment on juvenile offenders could
be considered contrary to the "evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society." 44 The opinion rejected
any contention that the sentencing practices of other countries
were relevant in consideration of these standards. Statutes
generally Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
39. United States: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 24, at 650.
40. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380 (1989).
41. See id. The case held, specifically, that the imposition of the death
penalty on juvenile offenders aged 16 or over does not offend the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
42. Id. at 368 (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)).
43. Id. Justice Scalia pointed out that at the time of the
incorporation of the Bill of Rights "the common law set the rebuttable
presumption of incapacity to commit felonies (which were punishable by death)
at the age of 14." Id.
44. Id. at 369 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
45. Id. at 370. Justice Scalia wrote that although "the practices of other
nations, particularly other democracies, can be relevant to determining whether a
practice uniform among our people is not merely an historical accident, but
rather so 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' that it occupies a place not
merely in our mores, but, text permitting, in our Constitution as well, they cannot
serve to establish the first Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that the practice is
accepted among our people." Id.
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passed by a society's elected representatives, he suggested, should
be the first and most persuasive consideration as to a society's
standard of decency.46 Justice Scalia, in other words, believes that
the will of the majority should govern the Court's consideration of
this issue.47 And the will of the American people, he believed, did
not forbid the imposition of capital punishment for juvenile
offenders.4' Again, we see an insistence that the will of the
American people be viewed as separate and distinct from the will
of the rest of the world.
b. The dissenting opinion. -Justice Brennan rejected
this logic outright. He argued, with concurrence from Justices
Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, that the majority's approach
"would largely return the task of defining the contours of Eighth
Amendment protection to political majorities. 49  Further,
Brennan observed that the Supreme Court has long recognized
the relevance of contemporary standards of decency in other
countries to Eighth Amendment analysis.0 Within the world
community, he noted, the imposition of the death penalty for
juvenile crimes has been overwhelmingly disapproved."
2. Justice Blackmun, the Law of Nations, and the Death
Penalty for Juvenile Offenders (Stanford v. Kentucky). -Justice
Blackmun has spoken on numerous occasions about the subject of
12international standards and their effect on United States law. At
46. Id.
47. Ved P. Nanda, The United States Reservation to the Banon the Death
Penalty for Juvenile Offenders: An Appraisal Under the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 1311, 1326 (1993).
48. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.
49. Id. at 391 (Brennan, J., dissenting). To this end Brennan noted that "the
very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities
and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts."
Id. at 391-392 (citing West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
638 (1943)).
50. Id. at 389 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815, 830-831 (1988), Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796
(1982), Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977), Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958)).
51 Id. Over 50 countries, including all of Western Europe,
have formally abolished the death penalty, or have limited
its use to exceptional crimes such as treason. Of the
nations that retain capital punishment, a majority prohibits the execution of
juveniles. Id.
52. Justice Blackmun Addresses ASIL Annual Dinner, AMERICAN SOCIETY
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW NEWSLETTER, Mar. 1994.
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the 1994 Annual Dinner of the American Society of International
Law, for example, he discussed at length the role that the "law of
nations" should play in United States law.53 "The early architects
of our nation", he said, "were experienced diplomats who
appreciated that the law of nations was binding on the United
States.54 The Constitution itself, as well as the early history of the
country, clearly suggests that the founding fathers intended for
international laws and standards to be considered as part of
United States law.5  The Constitution, for example, gives
Congress the power to Adefine and punish... [o]ffenses against
the Law of Nations. 6 It also further identifies international
treaties as part of "the supreme Law of the Land.,
57
Justice Blackmun traced a string of early Supreme Court
cases that confirm an intent to incorporate international laws andstanardsintoU.S." "58
standards into U.S. jurisprudence. In the 1873 case of Chisholm
v. Georgia, for example, Chief Justice John Jay observed that the
United States "had, by taking a place among the nations of the
earth, become amenable to the laws of nations."5 9 An 1804 case
further held that Congress should never act in a way that violates
the law of nations if an alternative exists. 6° Perhaps most telling, in
a series of cases in the 1880's, the Court established that treaties
exist on the same level as federal law and that if they conflict the
one enacted more recently will control.6' Given this background,
Justice Blackmun viewed the decision in Stanford v. Kentucky as a
failure of the court to enforce this country's obligations under
62international law.
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. See id.
56. Id. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
57. Justice Blackmun Addresses ASIL Annual Dinner, supra note 52. See
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution of Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
58. Justice Blackmun Addresses ASIL Annual Dinner, supra at note 52.
59. See id (citing Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 Dali. 419, 474).
60. See id (citing Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118
(1804).
61. See id (citing to Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884); Whitney v.
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581,
600, 602-603 (1889)).
62. See id.
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Refusing to consider international practice in construing the
Eighth Amendment is convenient for a Court that wishes to
avoid conflict between the death penalty and the Constitution.
But it is not consistent with this Court's established
construction of the Eighth Amendment. If the substance of
the Eighth Amendment is to turn on the "evolving standards
of decency" of the civilized world, there can be no justification
for limited judicial inquiry to the opinions of the United States.
Interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, no less than that of
treaties and statutes, should be informed by a decent respect
61for the global opinions of mankind.
B. United States Ratification of the Covenant
During the Bush Administration, the U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee held a public hearing on November 21, 1991
and unanimously gave its advice and consent to the ratification of
the Covenant on April 2, 1992.64 Pursuant to a list of reservations,
understandings and declarations, the United States deposited its
instrument of ratification on June 8, 1992.6' The decision to finally
ratify the Covenant was certainly compelled by the role the
United States has adopted in the international arena in regard to
66the protection of human rights. The failure to ratify, in the eyes
of many, cast doubt on U.S. commitment to human rights and
67
overshadowed attempts to promote them in other countries.
1. The Reservations, Understandings and Declarations. -The
rights guaranteed in the Covenant closely parallel those of the
U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights.6' The Reservations,
Understandings and Declarations were adopted as a package,
however, to ensure that the Covenant does not require action
69inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution. Some of the
63. Id.
64. United States: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 24, at 649.
65. See Generally 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-01 (1992).
66. See id.
67. Id. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in its address to the
President recommending ratification of the Covenant, noted that, "[f]ailure to
ratify the covenant has blemished our record and cast doubt, in some quarters,
about the seriousness of our commitment to human rights." Id.
68. United States: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 24, at 649.
69. Id. at 649. One scholar has characterized the five principles guiding the
United States' attachment of this package as follows: 1) The United States will
not undertake any treaty obligation that it will not be able to carry out because it
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Reservations are justifiable where the U.S. standard is already in
place and offers more protection than the standard articulated in
the Covenant.70  Article Twenty of the Covenant, for example,
prohibits propaganda for war and advocacy of national, racial or
religious hatred.7 ' This provision clearly restricts the rights to
freedom of speech and expression protected by the First
Amendment.72
Article Six of the Covenant, however, deals with the issue of
capital punishment. 73 Article Six reads as follows:
1) Every human being has the inherent right to life. This
right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his life.
2) In countries which have not abolished the death penalty,
sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious
crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the
commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of
the present Covenant and to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This
penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment
rendered by a competent court.
3) When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of genocide,
it is understood that nothing in this Article shall authorize
is inconsistent with the United States Constitution; 2) United States adherence to
an international human rights treaty should not effect B or promise C change in
existing U.S. law or practice; 3) The United States will not submit to the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to decide disputes as to the
interpretation or application of human rights conventions; 4) Every human rights
treaty to which the United States adheres should be subject to a "federalism
clause" so that the United States could leave implementation of the convention
largely to the states; 5) Every international human rights agreement should be
"non-self-executing." Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights
Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (1995).
70. See id. at 342.
71. THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS, supra note 25 at 387. Article Twenty states that: 1) Any
propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law; and 2) Any advocacy of national,
racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or
violence shall be prohibited by law. Id.
72. See U.S. CONST. Amend. I. But see Henkin, supra note 69 at 342.
Henkin explains that had the executive branch wanted to avoid entering a
reservation to Article 20 it may have simply entered an "understanding" that
Article 20 only required a state party to prohibit speech that incites to unlawful
action. As this reading would be a plausible interpretation of Article 20, it could,
so understood, have been implemented by the United States under the
Constitution. Id.
73. THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS, supra note 25 at 380-381.
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any State Party to the present Covenant to derogate in any
way from any obligation assumed under the provisions of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide.
4) Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek
pardon or commutation of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or
commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all
cases.
5) Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes
committed by persons below eighteen years of age and shall
not be carried out on pregnant women.
6) Nothing in this Article shall be invoked to delay or to
prevent the abolition of capital punishment by any State
Party to the present Covenant.74
The U.S. has accepted without reservation the ban on using the
death penalty against pregnant women.75 It is important to note
that this does not represent a real concession since such executions
have never been an accepted practice at either the federal or the
state level.76
The Reservation does not reserve the right to continue
utilizing capital punishment for persons below eighteen years of77
age. The text of the reservation states that, "[t]he United States
reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, to
impose capital punishment on any person (other than a pregnant
woman) duly convicted under existing or future laws permitting
the imposition of capital punishment, including such punishment
for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age.,
78
Interestingly, the scope of the statement is actually much broader
than necessary to achieve the purpose of allowing the continued
use of the death penalty against those 16 and older.79 By its terms
the United States reserved not only the right to execute a person
74. Id.
75. See United States: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 24, at 649.
76. Id. Members of the Senate commented that "[l]egislation giving effect to
the Covenant's prohibition against executions of pregnant women will not be
required, since neither the Federal nor the state governments in fact carry out
executions until after the birth of the condemned woman's child." Id.
77. Id. at 654.
78. Id.
79. Henkin, supra note 69 at 344.
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who committed a capital crime at age 16 or 17, but also the right to
execute a child, of any age.80
2. Public Reaction to the Reservations, Understandings and
Declarations to the Covenant. -Numerous different human rights
organizations and educational institutions expressed opposition to
the Senate's decision to include the reservation to the Covenant's
ban on the execution of juvenile offenders." Amnesty
International, for example, expressed its concern in a letter to the
Hon. Claiborne Pell, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
82Committee in 1992. Although Amnesty International had
concerns about all of the Reservations, Declarations, and
Understandings introduced by the Administration, its members
felt particularly strongly about the reservation to Article Six."
Among other things, they stated that, "[a]rticle Six guarantees one
of the most fundamental rights protected by the ICCPR-the right
to life - and its provisions are among those which may never be
derogated from in any circumstances."" Other notable
organizations expressing concern were the faculties of Yale and
the University of Florida Law Schools. s5
3. Congressional Justification for Ratifying the Covenant
with the Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations. -The
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in making its decision to
ratify the Covenant, acknowledged the importance of adhering to
internationally recognized standards of human rights." It noted
that the U.S. record in this regard has been generally good but still
refused to support adherence to an international standard that
differs from U.S. law.17 It is interesting to note that the Committee
did seem to believe, although it was reluctant to openly advocate
it, that compliance with the international standard may be
appropriate.88 To this end, the committee stated, "it may be
80. Id.
81. See Generally 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-01.
82. Id.
83. See id.
84. Id. The members of Amnesty International refer in this statement to
Article 4(2) of the Covenant itself: "No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8
(paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made under this provision." THE
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS, supra note 25 at 380.
85. See 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-01.
86. See id.
87. United States: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 24, at 649.
88. See id.
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appropriate and necessary to question whether changes in U.S.
law should be made to bring the United States in to full
compliance at the international level."89 Consistent with this is the
federal death penalty's own exception for juvenile offenders. 9° As
one scholar has noted, "[i]f the United States were a unitary state,
we would likely have no death penalty for juvenile offenders."9'
The federal government has continued to contend, however,
that it is not the federal government's business to interfere with
criminal sentencing guidelines of the states, regardless of
international human rights concerns. 92 Congress believed that
adhering to the Convention with the inclusion of questionable
Reservations would allow the U.S. to participate with greater
credibility and effectiveness in promotion human rights reforms.93
The Committee did note that the Reservations did not preclude
states from eventually modifying their laws to reflect standards of
the Covenant.94
IV. The Case of Domingues v. State
A. The Trial and First Appeal
In October 1993, sixteen-year old Michael Domingues waited
for Arjin Pechpo and her four-year old son, Jonathan, behind the
front door of their home in Las Vegas.95 Upon their arrival
96Domingues strangled Pechpo with a cord. He then forced
Jonathan into the tub with Pechpo's body, filled the tub with
water, and threw a hair dryer into the water in an attempt to
electrocute him.97 When that failed to kill the child Domingues
stabbed him to death.98  At trial, his girlfriend testified that
Domingues' intention had been to kill Pechpo and steal her car. 9
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. Spiro, supra note 34 at 575.
92. See id.
93. See United States: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 24, at 649.
94. See id.
95. Domingues v. State, 917 P.2d 1364, 1369 (Nev. Sup. Ct. May 30, 1996).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1370 (summarizing various discussions she had with Domingues on
the night of the murders, [his girlfriend] recounted Domingues' admissions about
the crimes).
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In August 1994, Domingues was convicted of one count of
burglary, one count of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon,
one count of first degree murder and one count of first degree
murder with the use of a deadly weapon.' ° At the age of
seventeen, he was sentenced to death for each of the two murder
convictions.'O° In 1996, Domingues took his first appeal to the
Supreme Court of Nevada, contesting ten different rulings on the
part of the trial court. °2 The Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court, deciding that any error committed by the lower court had
been harmless in nature and upheld the sentence of death.' 3
B. The Second Appeal -Applying The Covenant
Domingues then took a second appeal to the Supreme Court
of Nevada by filing a motion for correction of an illegal sentence
on the basis of Article 6 of the Covenant.' °4 The question in front
of the Nevada Supreme Court was whether a Nevada statute, °5
which allows for imposition of the death penalty on defendants
who are at least sixteen years of age at the time of the capital
offense, should be superseded by Article Six of the Covenant'
6
Domingues argued that the Senate's Reservation was invalid and
100. Domingues v. State, 961 P.2d 1279 (Nev. Sup. Ct. July 31, 1998).
101. Id.
102. Domingues, 917 P.2d at 1364. The assignments of error alleged by
Domingues were as follows: 1) the corpus delicti rule required the prosecutor to
show that the defendant had actually used a deadly weapon; 2) the convictions
for robbery with a deadly weapon and murder with a deadly weapon were not
supported by evidence; 3) material harm had occurred by the limiting of the
defendants cross-examination of one of the witnesses; 4) the testimony of the
father of the defendant's girlfriend regarding separate and independent offenses
was not properly admitted; 5) color photographs of the autopsy and crime scene
were not properly admitted; 6) the prosecutor's statements constituted
prosecutorial misconduct; 7) evidence of defendant's prior bad acts was not
properly admitted in the penalty phase; 8) the evidence was insufficient to
establish torture as an aggravating circumstance for imposition of the death
penalty; 9) the error in instructing the jury on torture as an aggravating factor
affected the result; and 10) the imposition of the death penalty was excessive. Id.
103. Id.
104. Domingues, 961 P.2d at 1280.
105. NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.025 (1967). The text of the statute reads "[a]
death sentence shall not be imposed or inflicted upon any person convicted of a
crime now punishable by death who at the time of the commission of such crime
was under the age of 16 years. As to such person, the maximum punishment that
may be imposed shall be life imprisonment." Id (emphasis added).
106. Domingues, 961 P.2d at 1280.
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that the prohibition against imposing capital punishment on
juvenile offenders is the supreme law of the land. °7 As a result
each individual state has the responsibility to obey its provisions.
0 8
1. The Majority Holding. -The court declined to address
the substance of Domingues' argument.' °9 It summarily rejected
the possibility that the Senate's Reservation of the states' right to
impose the death penalty on juvenile offenders is invalid. "
Because such laws have withstood Constitutional scrutiny the
Court did not feel compelled to explore the issue any further."' In
the end the Court rejected Domingues' appeal in a three to two
vote."2
2. The Dissenting Opinions. -Two Justices dissented in this
opinion because the majority refused to address what they felt to
be the main issue of the case: what is the effect of the Covenant's
adoption on the laws of and within the United States."3 Justice
Springer focused his analysis on the fact that because international
treaties ordinarily become the supreme law of the land, the state
has an independent responsibility to conduct itself in a manner
consistent with the terms of the treaty. "1 This being so, the state
cannot consider itself to be in compliance with the treaty while
rejecting one of its most vital terms.'
Justice Rose took a slightly different path and focused his
analysis on the fact that the district court should have considered
whether the Senate's reservation was valid. "' He believed that the
district court should have given this issue a full hearing and that
the Nevada Supreme Court should have remanded the question to
that court for such purpose.' 7 According to Justice Rose there is
more than enough evidence that the U.S. Reservation to Article 6
of the Covenant may be invalid."' Article 4, Section 2 of theCovenant, in particular, states that [n]o derogation from Articles
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 1281 (Rose, J., dissenting).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Ed Vogel, Court Rejects Appeal by Condemned Killer, LAS VEGAS
REVIEW-JOURNAL, Aug. 1, 1998, at 3B. See also Domingues, 961 P.2d at 1280.
113. Domingues, 961 P.2d at 1280.
114. See id. at 1280-81 (Springer, J., dissenting).
115. See id.
116. See id. at 1281 (Rose, J., dissenting).
117. Id.
118. See id.
406 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 18:2
6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16, and 18 may be made under
this provision.""' 9  Also, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law states that, "[a] state may enter a reservation to a
multilateral international agreement unless.., the reservation is
incompatible with the object and purpose of the agreement." 120
There is reason to consider, according to Justice Rose, that the
prohibition of the death penalty against juvenile offenders is an
integral part of the treaty. 121
According to one scholar, reservations to human rights
treaties are generally tolerated if they do not deprive the provision
of its basic purpose.' This limited leniency is allowed to facilitate
the possibility of ratification by states that generally respect the
obligations of the instrument but fail to comply on one or another
small point.12 The Human Rights Committee has determined that
reservations to provisions of the Covenant that are also customary
international law are not allowed.' 24 Many believe that support
has not yet been sufficiently demonstrated to establish juvenile
executions as violative of a customary international norm.121 Such
a norm does appear, however, to be emerging."'
All of these questions support Justice Rose's belief that the
case should have been remanded to determine whether the U.S. is
even a party to the Covenant. If the Reservation to Article 6 is
found to be invalid, and any invalid reservation can be separated
from ratification of the treaty, then the United States would still
be bound by the Covenant and subject to its ban on capital
punishment for juvenile offenders. 2 If, however, the reservationis found to be invalid, and cannot be separated from the
119. Domingues, 961 P.2d at 1281. See Article 4(2) of the Covenant, THE
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS, supra note 25 at 380.
120. Domingues, 961 P.2d at 1281. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 313 (1)(c) (1987).
121. See Domingues, 961 P.2d at 1281.
122. Schabas, supra note 27.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See Schabas, supra note 27.
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ratification of the treaty, then the United States may not be a
party to the Covenant at all.1
21
V. The Nevada Supreme Court Abandoned Its Duty
The court in Domingues failed in its responsibility to consider
the very important issues at stake in the case. The Reservation to
Article 6 of the Covenant allows states to continue using the death
penalty on juvenile offenders because the Supreme Court has held
that such use does not violate the Constitution. It is clear that the
federal government does not support the substance of the
Reservation as it has banned the use of the death penalty on
juvenile offenders in its own criminal system. The federal
government's decision to include the Reservation, therefore, was
driven by what it considered to be its obligation to allow the
individual states room to shape their own criminal sentencing
policies. The right to execute juvenile offenders, however, is not a
Constitutional right. Therefore, it is questionable whether the
federal government was bound to make the reservation to Article
Six on this basis.
Even if the Reservation was necessary, out of deference to
the individual states, the Nevada Supreme Court should have
taken this opportunity to consider for itself what relevance the
Covenant should have. This Comment does not wholly reject the
logic of the majority opinion in Stanford. American standards of
decency in the issue of Eighth Amendment analysis should carry
considerable weight. As it seems, the will of the American people
did not forbid the imposition of capital punishment for juvenile
offenders at the time of the Stanford decision.
There seems, however, to be a rising indication of public
disapproval for the death penalty. 29 One juror, after delivering a
death sentence in Texas in 1998, commented on the difficulty of
making the decision: "When I walked back into the jury room
after delivering the verdict, I felt like a murderer."'130 Although
public approval for the death penalty in general continues to
hover around 70%, that support is arguably far less solid than it131
seems. When offered as one of several different alternatives,
128. See id.
129. See Amnesty International, USA Campaign B Rights For All, Reports,
briefings and focus (visited Dec. 5, 1999) <http://www.rightsforall-usa.org
/info/report/r06.htm#top>
130. Id.
131. Id.
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such as life imprisonment without possibility of parole, that
percentage drops dramatically.3 2 In light of this, and given the
extreme nature of capital punishment generally, the question is
one that should be continually reconsidered. By taking the
Reservation to Article 6 of the Covenant the federal government
left that responsibility to the states. The Nevada Supreme Court
missed a perfect opportunity for doing so in its summary
treatment of Domingues v. State.
VI. Conclusion
The use of the death penalty has long been a staple of United
States criminal sentencing and the Supreme Court has upheld the
constitutionality of its use on juvenile offenders. The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was ratified
in the U.S. in the midst of this environment. Accordingly,
ratification of the instrument occurred with the addition by
Congress of a package of Reservations, Understandings, and
Declarations. Of note was the Reservation allowing the continued
execution of juvenile offenders in this country despite the strict
ban contemplated in the Covenant.
The recent Nevada case, Domingues v. State, directly
challenged the legality of death penalty sentences for juvenile
offenders under the Covenant. The Nevada Supreme Court
summarily declined to address the substance of the appeal by
relying on the Reservation to Article 6 of the Covenant. There
are serious questions, however, as to the validity of the
reservation.
Further, the federal government's decision to include the
Reservation was driven by its obligation to allow the individual
states room to shape their own criminal sentencing policies. The
Senate Committee has indicated, however, that it believes that
compliance by the states, with the international standard, is in
order. The federal government itself has banned the use of the
death penalty on juvenile offenders.
Even if the reservation was necessary, out of deference to
federalism, the Nevada Supreme Court should have taken this
opportunity to consider for itself what relevance the Covenant
should have. In the U.S., there seems to be a rising indication of
public disapproval for the death penalty in general. The
disapproval of the international community is evident. This trend,
132. Id.
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in light of the extreme nature of capital punishment, should
mandate that the question be continually reconsidered. The
Nevada Supreme Court abdicated its responsibility to do so and
missed a perfect opportunity in its summary treatment of
Domingues v. State.
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